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A Re-examination of US-European Relations from an Economic 
Point of View. 
I. The over-estimation of foreign-policy differences· 
'12 
If it is true that writers have a special sensibility for future 
,.,. 
developments or trends, I'd like to draw your attention to 
Paul Erdmann's new science fiction no vel 11 The last Days of 
America 11 , This bestseller analyses the process of the military, 
political and economic decline of the US in the eighties -
leading to the result that StrauB wins the '84 election with 
a land-slide victory. The key plank in his platform is: the 
nuclear national rearmement of West Germany because the US 
are unable to continue guaranteeing West-European security 
vis-a-vis the USSR. I'd like to underline that this book is 
not a product of so-called European Anti-Americanism but 
written by a US-citizen. 
But back to reality, The decline of political legitimacy and 
economic success is - at least - more true for the sid~ of the 
Soviet Bloc than for the one of the Western Alliance. Only in 
military terms the Soviet Union remains very strong. It is 
subject of discussion within NATO how to react to this situation. 
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I don't think it's appropriate to over-stress this as a 
crisis of the Western Alliance. I'm absolutely sure that 
the fundamentals, based on common values and interests, 
as well as the simple assumption, that security could 
only be guaranteed in co-operation are still unchallenged 
and unshaken. But one has to take into account, that NATO 
is not only limited in its purpose and region, but that it 
is a league of fifteen- sorry, today only fourteen-
democratic and souvereign nations. Each of them demand 
that its national interests are highly respected. This 
fact is an extremely important difference to the Warsaw-Pact -
where the Eastern European countries mainly are forced to 
follow the line of the Soviet Union, no matter whether it 
fits into their national interests or not - with the result 
of an increasing Anti-Sovietism in these states. To put it 
into a nut-shell: the allies of the USSR are easy-going but 
unreliable, in NATO the allies are troublesome but reliable. 
After this more general statement, I'd like to elaborate 
shortly on the security challenges we are facing and the 
different perception and strategies which are discussed in 
Europe and the US. 
I think, most of us agree that the world today is more 
dangerous than - maybe - ten years ago: 
- Afghanistan happened and Poland showed - not for the 
first time - how fragile the internal stability of 
Eastern Europe is; 
- the Middle-East-Conflict has - despite the Camp David 
Agreement - become more uncalculable and is still 
jeopardizing the economic stability of the West, although 
-t~~ dependence from OPEC-oil declined; 
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- the instability of Third World Countries is increasing, 
generating a hulk of regional conflicts in which the 
super-powers one day might get involved. The North-South-
Conflict as well could lead to rising international 
tensions. 
I don't want to discuss neither the implications and reasons 
• for the tough foreign-policy rhethorics the Reagan-administra-
tion uses mainly for domestic reasons nor the question, how 
European concerns are reflected in US-mass-media. Besides 
this - and much more important from my point of view -
there are three points of different perceptions, leading 
to different conclusions. 
1. The foreign policy of the US is concentrating on its 
adversary, the USSR, another nuclear world power. 
European concerns concentrate on all three kinds of 
international risks, I mentioned before, and Europeans 
don't believe that the other conflicts could disappear 
if the Soviet Union would change its behavior. 
2. There are different opinions of the role which NATO 
has to play in the current situation. The US government 
demands NATO to play an active and global role (including, 
of course, a remarkable increase in military spending), 
whereas the Europeans stress more the limited purpose 
and area of a defense alliance against the Soviet threat 
in Europe. 
3. The difference, how to react to the present Soviet 
behavior has been more significant. It's not a question 
of a moral judgement of what happened in Afghanistan and 
· Poland. There is no doubt that all members of the Western 
Alliance totally condemn these events unanimously. But 
a common reaction to the challenge is missing. For 
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certain reasons: 
different historical experience, i.e. Europeans 
remember well, what happened after Berlin '53 and '61, 
Hungary '56, CSSR '68, the worker riots in Poland in 
'56, '70 and '77 (in '56 and '70 more people had been 
killed than in '81). Even at times of an absolute nuclear 
superiority of the US, the degree and possibility of 
influence to internal developments in the Eastern bloc 
proved to be extremely limited; 
- different approaches about the effects and implications 
of trade and technological transfer. Already in the 
fifties we had a controversial discussion on whether 
hungry or well-fed communists are Less aggressive -
to put it down to earth terms, In the beginning of the 
'60s we took the decision for the latter option and, 
from my point of view, the· arguments remain the same; 
- and, last but not least, different benefits from 
detente policy, which are of course in Europe and 
especially West Germany much more visible and distinct 
than in the US. That is one of the reasons why Europeans 
will stick to detente policy as long as possible. The 
other is, that the alternative, to go back to the 
Cold War, seems not to be very promising as the past 
has shown, 
There are these differences in opinions within the Alliance 
but they are not insurmontable, Both sides on the Atlantic 
are willing and prepared to finally come to a common approach. 
W~at we need is a review-process like the one of the Harmel 
Report in '67/68 which came up with recommendations for 
defense and detente policy within NATO - a policy we are 
pursuing until today, But within the last 15 years the 
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world has changed and there is, of course, the need for 
readjustment. I think, that our current policy-framework 
is flexible enough to cope with this readjustment process 
(and I don't think that a·complete policy reversal is possible 
or necessary), However, I plead for a greater measure of 
levelheadedness, My interest in politics goes back to the 
year 1960, and since then I have under four US presidents 
seen situations in which relations between Europe and the 
United States were said to have "reached an all-time low", 
It would really be a bad joke of history if we were to allow 
others to talk us into believing that the inability of the 
Soviet system to meet the basic needs of its citizens and 
adapt its social structures to changed conditions is a 
crisis of the Western Alliance, 
II. The persistent Economic Crisis - the real threat for the 
the Western World 
The real menace to a stable alliance seems to root more in 
the bleak economic outlook than in the political differences 
in opinions, mentioned above, And to a remarkable higher degree 
than in the political and military area, the US has failed 
to pursue a responsible economic policy adequate for an 
"economique dominante". Since the break-down of the post-war 
monetary system of Bretton Wood in '71 - an often forgotten 
but nevertheless lasting negative and grave consequence of 
• the Vietnam-War - the US has been widely regarded as an 
economic "trouble-maker", not as a "trouble-shooter". This 
criticism has been brushed up as a result of the long-lasting 
and world-wide recession after the second oil-price crisis. 
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This perception is suitable to undermine the political leader-
ship of the US to a higher degree than all sort of foreign 
policy quarrel, because it is affecting much more the average 
"man in the street". (in his real life) 
I would like to elaborate shortly on three economic risks 
in the months to come which really could jeopardize the 
cooperation within the Western Alliance (and I strongly 
belief that a smooth political cooperation could only work 
on the basis of a close economic cooperation): 
1. The "interest-rate-war" 
The economic experiment of "Reaganomics" - the approach, 
to fight inflation by monetary means only and to stimulate 
at the same time the economy by fiscal means - has not only 
led to extreme high interest rates (partly caused by accelera-
ting budget deficits) but has pushed the American economy to 
the brinkmanship of a deep and long-lasting recession, too, 
Of course, the Americans are hurt most by this policy, which, 
at least, is protracting the upswing of the US economy. But 
in addition there is a severe impact on the European economics, 
as well. Given the fact that the second oil-price-crisis has 
thrown the European countries into a current account deficit, 
they are now depending on high interest rates for attracting 
capital-imports in order to compensate their balance-of-
payment deficit, 
Only extreme strong economies, which could get rid of the 
current account deficit, (like Japan and - forthcoming -
West Germany) could decouple more or less their domestic 
monetary policy from the dominating impact of the US monetary 
P?licy since their currency is appreciating and thus able to 
compensate interest-rate differences by appreciation-expecta-
tions. But what is the alternative to weaker European economies? 
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There is an increasing pressure noticable to decouple 
from the impacts of US monetary policy by administrative 
measures (i.e. capital-flow-control, split currency markets). 
This is regarded as the Ultimate mean to gain space for 
stimulating the domestic economy what is so urgently needed 
in view of accelerating unemployment figures. This develop-
ment is undesirable and extremely risky; such an ''interest-
rate-war" might shake the fundamentals of economic cooperation 
and integration, so far reached in the Western Alliance. 
However, one has to recognize that high interest rates are 
not the only economic problem of the Western industrialized 
countries. In the years to come, they will be involved in a 
difficult, costly and painful process of long-term adaptation: 
sky-rocketing energy prices (despite the current, but instable 
oil-glut); increased international competition with advanced 
developing countries; new technological advances; changes in 
demand, in lifestyle and in pattern of consumption; the con-
flicting goals of economy and ecology. These are but a few 
of the problems which are part of the economic adjustment 
process. But in this economic environment the strategically 
important, long-term-orientated investment in modernization 
and basic economic restructuring (i.e. in the energy sector) 
is especially hard hit by high interest rates. 
2. The temptation of protectionism. 
Thecombination of a sluggish economy and huge trade-balance 
deficits is leading to an increasing pressure for protectionist 
measures. Almost all Western industrialized countries try to 
"re-conquer the domestic market" by self-restrain-agreement, 
non-tariff-barriers and hidden import restrictions instead 
of improved competiveness. The governments are more or less 
sinners - with an amount of creative fantasv which is missing 
I 
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in tackling other problems. The demand for protectionism 
in Congress is obviously mounting despite the administration's 
resistance, Charges against "unfair trade", possible legisla-
tion for "reciprocity'' and budget-amendments "to buy American 
only" (e.g. military equipment) are reasons for concern in 
the European capitals, in particular since the current 
US account is recently showing a deficit, Partly, this 
deficit is a result of the hig~-interest-rate policy: 
The tight monetary policy leads to an over-valued dollar, 
thus promoting imports and impeding exports. Partly, it is 
due to the administration's policy of "benign neglect": 
the non-intervention in the currency-market with the result 
that the value of the dollar so far has over- or undershot 
the range of the "real" value determined by economic funda-
mentals (that is the gravest mistake of a narrow-minded 
monetarist approach - to neglect the external value of a 
currency and to concentrate on the internal value), 
3. The crushed debt burden. 
Often failed to have been noticed, especially in the US, 
is the fact that the debt-financed industrialization has 
not only thwarted in Poland or Rumania, The strategy to 
import capital-goods, pre-financed by credits, and to have 
the debt paid back with products out of that equipment, 
failed in many Third-World and threshold-countries, looking 
at mere figures and ratios, like GNP to foreign debt or 
interest-obligation to export-earnings - there are countries 
worse than Poland. ~lost of the recycling of "petro-dollars" 
has been done by private institutions - under the basic 
assumption that a country couldn't be declared as default, 
as some short-sighted hard-liners proposed in the case of 
Poland. Maybe they really didn't know that this would lead 
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to a complete re-assessment of each debitor country -
regardless of the political system - and each debt therefore 
would have triggered an "avalanche" in the financial market. 
Nobody had known where to end up, because so far the inter-
national monetary institutions or supportive action by the 
creditor-countries always b~iled out the debitor through 
moratoriums, re-scheduling of the debt, lowering the interest 
rates a.s.o. (e.g. in the case of Chile (1973), Peru (1977) 
or Turkey (since 1978)). 
The amount of debts, the gloomy export-prospects for most 
countries, the political and commercial risks involved 1 ) -
all this impose a permanent threat to the smooth operating 
of all financial institutions, we depend so heavily on. No 
attempt to tackle this problem on an international level has 
been done so far. 
III. Conclusion 
The simple conclusion of my analyses is the following: 
We are able and prepared to overcome the differences in 
the field of foreign policy. However, the real challenge 
to the stability of the Western Alliance, maybe even to the 
survival of democratic welfare-states lies in the economic 
field. Until today we have avoided to lapse into a 
"beggar-my-neighbor-policy" - a big success compared to 
the first World-Economic-crisis in 1929/35. 
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1 ) For a detailed analysis see: Schafer, M.B. (ed), 
Gefahrdete Weltfinanzen, Bonn 1980 and the Annual Report 
of the International ~onetary Fund 1981, Washington D.C. 
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But the lasting of this policy ca~not be taken for 
granted, let alone'the solution of new problems, which 
have arisen since the early seventies. In the cautious 
language of international organisations, the OECD stated 
., 
in its last "Economic Outlook": "It is becoming increasingly 
evident that devising a truly satisfactory domestic economic 
policy necessarily also involves an important additional 
dimension of assessing its likely international. interaction 
with the policies of other countries." The real problem-
in contrary to the well-defined foreign-policy-problems -
is a lack of consciousness and awareness of the economic 
risks, which might shake. the Alliance in the months to 
come, 
